Grant Newsham is a Senior Research Fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies, with 20 years of experience in Japan as a diplomat, business executive, and US Marine Corps Liaison Officer to the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.
@Nobody should be surprised that a Chinese drilling vessel parked itself in Vietnamese waters. This is just the latest manifestation of PRC efforts to dominate the South China Sea – going back to the 1970fs. It is also the logical outcome of years of accommodating China in hopes it would become a liberal democracy and play by international rules.
@The PRC considers the bulk of the South China Sea as Chinese territory and has been consistent – even if unreasonable – on this point for decades. The West has simply chosen not to believe them. Chinafs modus operandi has been to push and test the response, pull back if necessary – though with the benchmark moved forward, and then push some more when the time is right. Ultimately, it is looking to see what it can get away with.
@Regarding the current incident with Vietnam, one should also note the PRC in 2014 is different than the PRC in 2004. Its military capability has markedly increased along with its economic heft, and it is less willing to negotiate and back down. In some respects, China resembles a resentful drunk talking himself into a fight.
@Why did the PRC decide to challenge the Vietnamese – especially given Chinafs preference for bullying Japanese and Filipinos? Mr. Obamafs recent and surprisingly strong pronouncements in support of Japan and the Philippines appear to have taken the PRC aback. Thus, Vietnam was perhaps the most convenient target. Unfortunately for the Chinese, the Vietnamese are also best able to ebite backf amongst potential victims in the South China Sea.
@Chinese behavior is not that of a confident nation. Indeed, from the Chinese ruling class perspective, picking a fight in the South China Sea seems like a useful distraction.
@The PRCfs economy is a mess, with a credit bubble and bad loans dwarfing Japanfs ebubblef of the late 1980fs. And concocted statistics can only create the illusion of growth for so long. Chinafs leaders have correctly determined the economy needs to shift from an export driven, mercantilist economy addicted to government einvestment.f The Communist Party of Chinafs (CPC) ability to handle this transformation is doubtful, however. Equally worrisome for Chinafs rulers is widespread official corruption. A slowing economy tends to raise public interest in corruption and unfairness. In such cases, lashing out at eenemiesf is a classic response.
@One also worries that Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) leaders appear to be angling for a fight. They have plenty of new equipment and one detects the bravado of a newly-strong military that hasnft fought a war in the last half century.
@The PRCfs behavior towards Vietnam and others is self-destructive. Besides harming Chinafs image it creates more eanti-PRCf unity among ASEAN nations than has ever existed, is causing regional nations to build up their defenses, and is creating support (indeed, demand) for the US military presence in Asia. And at some point, Chinese actions will affect trade – the PRCfs lifeblood. The PRC seems to have forgotten its echarm offensivef from the 1990fs-2000fs that was paying considerable dividends, and like a fat man at a buffet, the Chinese seem unable to restrain themselves.
A Plan of Action
@Of course, Vietnam deserves Western and ASEAN support – diplomatically, politically, legally, and militarily. ASEAN also needs to stick together over the South China Sea. Japan needs to increase defense spending and exert itself more than it has to date. However, ultimately the United States will determine future events in the South China Sea and Asia – depending on what it does or does not do.
@The United States must look beyond the immediate dispute between China and Vietnam – that will not be last Chinese provocation in the region –and consider a more comprehensive and long-term approach to dealing with Chinese assertiveness. The objective is to help PRCfs rulers to do the cost-benefit analysis and see that there is more to be gained from restraint and playing by established rules than from throwing ones weight around.
@Such a policy might include the following components.
The US has its own core interests
@Just as China demands respect for its ecore interestsf, the United States should declare that the US has its own ecore interestsf in Asia and will defend them. This requires more than just talk; the US should continue the eAsia pivotf and spend what is necessary to make it meaningful. As important, US forces need to maintain a constant and obvious presence on, below, and above the South and East China Seas. Furthermore, the United States should broadly publicize Chinese military provocations – such as the recent USS Cowpens incident. Donft hush them up, always respond, and be prepared to ebump backf.
@Solidly linked US and Japanese forces, with the eunsplittablef political linkage that comes with it, presents PLA planners with their most difficult challenge. Neither the US or Japan can maintain its position in Asia/Pacific without the otherfs fullest support. The US and Japan should better integrate their military capabilities, to include contingency planning, joint training and patrols, and interoperable command and control systems – along the lines of the US-UK military relationship when bilateral relations were at their peak.
@Better aligning US forces and Japan Self Defense Forces will also have a bracing effect on other regional nations who are nervously watching the PRC.
@Meanwhile, the United States should restrict engagement with the Peoplefs Liberation Army (PLA) to only what is professional and essential. End the existing policy of engagement for engagementfs sake. It has not produced a less belligerent Chinese military nor has it deterred the PRC. More to the point, it makes the US appear to be a supplicant, clearly the more interested in developing military-to-military relations, and proffers to Beijing a point of leverage where one need not exist. Instead, wait for PRC behavior to improve, at which time the US can and should welcome the PLA. The US should consider withdrawing the PRCs invitation to the July 2014 RIMPAC exercise in Hawaii in light of recent events.
Implement the Taiwan Relations Act as originally intended
@Recognizing the fundamental importance of Taiwan, the US should make it clear that it backs Taiwan against any coerced change in the status quo. This means the US should provide requested high-tech arms and even submarines. The US might even push Japan to sell its older subs to Taiwan, keying this to Chinese behavior towards Japan (and Taiwan). Taiwan is a priceless reminder that Chinese can govern themselves in a consensual manner, have a free press and a full range of individual liberties and a functioning legal system. Indeed, Taiwan belies the Communist Party of Chinafs (CPCfs) claims that stability in China requires repression. eOne-Chinaf that looks like Taiwan would not be a bad thing.
Use economic pressure to affect PRCfs military behavior
@It is time the PRC follows WTO commitments. Rather than exceptions, the US should insist China obey trade laws and allow reciprocal treatment and market access for US and foreign companies and respect intellectual property rights. Simply enforce existing rules and apply a reciprocal treatment standard to Chinese companies seeking to do business in the United States. The recent WTO decision regarding Chinese rare earth exports offers a perfect opportunity to implement this radical approach of expecting China to abide by its commitments.
@In extreme circumstances and as a last-ditch alternative to military action, the US might apply pressure of the sort that will squeeze China's ruling class by upsetting the 'manufacturing/export money making machine' that is the basis of its power. Start taking 30 days to clear all Chinese ships entering the United States, and justify it with the need to check carefully for counterfeits and to ensure product safety. Delayed cargo clearance and Lloyds of London raising insurance rates potentially apply more pressure than the USAF could dream of inflicting.
Use international law to challenge the PRC
@The USG should energetically seek to bring territorial and other disputes to international forums for resolution and support countries that do as well. Aggressively and unapologetically speak up for our system of rights, freedoms, and consensual government. This is seldom done.
Publicize corruption by Chinafs elite
@The CPC has outdone the old KMT corruption-wise, and the US should stop abetting illegal capital outflows that constitute one of the biggest thefts in history. CPC harassment of the New York Times and Bloomberg following reports of ruling class corruption and unbelievable wealth show how frightening this issue is to the Chinese leadership. Expose ruling class corruption and trumpet it repeatedly. The USG is aware of much of it and can uncover more with proper effort. Simply requiring Chinese investors in the US to prove their money is lawfully exported from the PRC would be a good first start.
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The US clearly has options – far more effective than mere appeasement and far short of going to war – when dealing with PRC efforts to displace the United States and to dominate the Asia/Pacific region contrary to international law and the wishes of regional nations. Indeed, making use of these options reduces the prospects of conflict. It will of course be necessary to overcome the fear of eprovokingf China that frequently hamstrings US military and government actions. Anything short of acquiescing to PRC demands will be provocative to the PRC. One must get used to this.
@The current spat between Vietnam and China is a useful reminder of the broader issues and principals at stake in the South China Sea. There is more to be gained from a firm approach than by a policy that values ede-escalationf above all else. Such a policy, like a shot of anesthetic provide only temporary relief and lead to far more serious problems later on.
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