@ If opponents of reinterpreting Article 9 of Japanfs Constitution to allow
collective self defense are correct, one expects the day after Prime Minister
Abe invokes this right he will pack the Japanese Army onto Navy ships and set
off to invade Peru. Opponents seem to believe permitting collective self defense
will inevitably lead Japan into war especially if the Americans demand it. It
will not.
@ Allowing collective self defense merely gives Japan the option of using its military to support other countries that are under attack. Japan is not obligated to do anything. It is free to say no. Indeed, other US allies have been telling America enof for years. The British famously stayed on the sidelines during Vietnam, and more recently, the Canadians declined to join the Iraq War – while playing a leading role in Afghanistan. And the French even try to sabotage US efforts on occasion, but are still mostly considered an ally.
@ Like every country, Japan uses its military when it believes its interests are at stake. Since Japanfs first overseas operation in recent times nearly 20 years ago in Cambodia, successive Japanese administrations have carefully considered Japanfs interests before committing troops or police. Japan has perhaps been too cautious, but there is reason to believe this deliberate approach will continue. Any Japanese administration that does differently will not last long. And as a practical matter, considerable limits will remain on a Prime Ministerfs ability to employ the JSDF.
@ If PM Abe succeeds in adopting collective self defense the world will not end. More likely, nobody will notice anything different. Ironically, Japan has been doing things that look a lot like collective self defense for years – despite the Japanese governmentfs epic sophistry to call it something else.
@ The JSDF dispatch to Iraq was at least collective self defensefs efirst cousinf, as were the MSDFfs Indian Ocean refueling operations. JSDFfs participation in anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa – to include establishing a JSDF base in Djibouti – is also not far removed from collective self defense. And despite the United Nations imprimatur, GSDFfs South Sudan dispatch is nonetheless sending the JSDF to assist a government under pressure, and occasionally under attack.
@ In all these cases, bizarre limitations on JSDF activities to create the illusion they are not doing anything ewarlikef, and rules of engagement bordering on the ridiculous do not change the fact JSDF has been used overseas in eforward leaningf ways and in dangerous areas for a number of years. Formally recognizing collective self defense will only be an incremental change – and eliminate much of the absurdity in Japanfs otherwise laudable use of the JSDF overseas.
Sound advice from the Advisory Committee
@ The Prime Ministerfs advisory committee on reinterpreting Article 9 did good work. The guidelines are sensible. They donft try to anticipate every conceivable situation that might warrant ecollective self-defensef, and allow a helpful degree of flexibility. The Diet approval requirement is also a good thing. It requires Japanese Prime Ministers to actually lead, and make the case for the use of military force. This demands a clear sense of Japanfs national interests and the ability to articulate and persuade several hundred Diet members (and implicitly, the public) that military operations are necessary. This is what democracies do.
@ Even US Presidents must do this. One recalls the first President Bush and the narrow vote to allow military action in the first Gulf War. Even the most recent President Bush had a tough time convincing Congress to go to war against Saddam Hussein.
Japanese Pacifism – real or faux
@ One often hears Japan is a pacifist country – mandated as such by the Constitutionfs Article 9. Therefore, it is argued, the epacifist Constitutionf prohibits collective self defense. If Japan is pacifist, it is a curious version of pacifism.
@ Article 9 has long since been interpreted and reinterpreted out of any possible relation to its original meaning. Article 9fs plain meaning is clear. Following it requires disbanding the JSDF and scrapping its equipment. However, one does not detect a huge push to do so from the public – or even most professional pacifists. If one can overlook the contrast between Article 9 and reality, one then notes that many Japanese pacifists – while flaunting their anti-war, anti-military beliefs, seem happy to have the United States military slaughter anyone who might threaten Japan. All in all, a curious division of labor to allow a curious version of pacifism.
@ One sometimes feels that Article 9 and the self-imposed prohibition on collective self-defense are excuses for the Japanese Government to avoid doing things it would rather not do, instead of being real principles shaping Japanfs policies and behavior. This is a familiar variation on the eitfs too hardf excuse Japanese officials have successfully wielded against US diplomats for decades.
@ Another sub-text of opposition to collective self defense is the notion the Japanese are a unique, childish race – prone to violent rampages if allowed to contemplate military operations overseas. There is not a shred of evidence to support this argument. Indeed, Japan has been one of the worldfs most responsible nations over the last six decades – and used the JSDF for the common good in a number of foreign countries. Japan and the Japanese deserve far more credit than opponents of collective self defense are willing to allow.
Collective Self Defense is necessary to retain American support
@ If Japan hopes to retain US support it needs to allow collective self defense. This is of course Japanfs choice. The Americans will have a hard time maintaining their position in Asia/Pacific without Japanese military support. However, the Japanese have almost no chance of resisting Chinese bullying and ultimate regional domination without being linked closely with US forces.
@ Collective self defense will inject a needed dose of equality into the bilateral defense relationship. The current ban on collective self defense effectively requires America to do the hard work of defending Japan without the Japanese having to pitch in to defend US forces. This made sense at one time -- especially in the immediate aftermath of World War II and for many decades afterwards when Japan faced no obvious threat. However, those days are long gone.
@ The idea that Americans will die defending Japan without Japan lifting a finger to assist them, is not exactly a vote getter in Washington, DC – or with the American public. And the PRCfs lobbyists will gladly point this out. One can imagine them scurrying up to Capitol Hill and appearing on the talk shows and stating, gJapan thinks it can whistle up the Americans to come die for it just like you would hail a taxicab outside the Mayflower Hotel.h This would resonate widely – even with people prone to support Japan.
@ If Japan shows at least a reciprocal willingness to defend Americans – to include shedding blood – it will undercut this potentially fatal political vulnerability. A relationship in which one side is pathologically dependent on the other cannot survive forever – and the US-Japan relationship has long been dangerously out of balance.
@ A Japanese Foreign Ministry official once told me I was mistaken about all this. The official, almost sticking his tongue out, said simply, eampo joyakuf (security treaty), as though this was a binding contract obligating the US to sacrifice everything for Japan. In other words, the sort of contract one might have obligating a plumber to come fix onefs kitchen sink. Like many MOFA officials, he knew little about contracts, and even less about Americans.
@ The prospect of Japan adopting collective self defense is widely supported in Washington DC. There is a sense, eitfs about timef. Reinterpreting the right to collective self defense potentially adds to US military capabilities in the region at a time when US forces and defense budgets are being pared down. And besides raw military benefit, it is politically important as a sign of Japanese commitment to the US-Japan relationship, and also to the broader cause of preserving democratic principles and rule of law in the region and elsewhere.
@ Importantly, despite differing polls there seems to be considerable public support in Japan for reinterpreting Article 9. This perhaps offers further proof the general public usually has more common sense than many Nagato-cho inhabitants.
Provoking the PRC?
@ It is hard to imagine anything Japan might do – other than surrender – that doesnft provoke the PRC. One should be less concerned over an alleged rise in Japanese militarism (for which there is scant evidence) than about the PRCfs longstanding society-wide campaign to demonize the Japanese. This has created frightening animosity throughout Chinese society towards Japan and Japanese people. Nothing good comes of this sort of thing, and tends to condition a population to the idea that violence to epunishf ones enemies is natural and deserved.
@ Ultimately, Japan will benefit from its new approach to collective self-defense – and the world will as well. It can use more countries like Japan getting involved, when appropriate, to protect the civilized worldfs principles. One also finds that willingness to get involved in collective self defense activities reduces the likelihood of actually having to do so.
@ Japan ought to be proud of its track record since 1945, and confident it will responsibly implement the right to collective self defense. Indeed, one might reasonably suggest that even now far more countries – even in Asia – would rather have the JSDF show up for collective self defense purposes than the Peoples Liberation Army.
@@@Grant Newsham is a senior research fellow at the Japan Forum for Strategic Studies.
@@@He is a former US Diplomat and US Marine Officer and has lived and worked in Japan
@@@for many years.
|
